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LABOR LAW PREEMPTION: Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
Roderick S. Lueck, a member of Local 248 of the United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (Local 248), worked for the Allis-Chalmers Corporation
(Allis-Chalmers). Allis-Chalmers and Local 248 entered into a
collective bargaining agreement that provided a group health
and disability plan for the Allis-Chalmers employees adminis-
tered by Aetna Life and Casualty Company (Aetna).' The collec-
tive bargaining agreement created a three-step procedure for ar-
bitrating grievances involving disability benefits.2 In 1981, Lueck
sought disability benefits for a nonoccupational injury by notify-
ing Allis-Chalmers of his injury and by filing a claim with
Aetna.3 Aetna approved the claim and eventually paid all of
Lueck's benefits, but allegedly in an untimely manner. Lueck ar-
gued that Allis-Chalmers and Aetna "intentionally, contemptu-
ously and repeatedly" failed to make payments which caused
Lueck to experience emotional distress, physical impairment,
pain and suffering and the accumulation of debts.4 Lueck sought
relief by bringing a cause of action in state court, based on the
state tort claim of bad faith handling of an insurance claim. He
chose not to seek redress through the grievance channels created
by the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Circuit
Court of Milwaukee County found, alternatively, that Lueck's
cause of action arose under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act,3 which requires redress under the grievance
1. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 562, 342 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1984)
(the plan entitled all union employees to disability benefits for nonoccupational
illnesses).
2. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1907-08 (1985). The agreement
provides a four-step grievance procedure for contract disputes and, in a separate letter of
understanding, the contract establishes the arbitration procedure for grievances concern-
ing disability benefits. An employee asserting an insurance-related complaint must first
bring it to the Supervisor of Employee Relations. The second step requires the employee
to bring the complaint before the Joint Plant Insurance Committee. Finally, if the issue
remains unresolved, the employee may seek relief under the arbitration agreement estab-
ished in the collective bargaining agreement.
3. Id. at 1908. Lueck injured his back carrying a pig to a pig roast at a friend's
home.
4. Id.; Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 562, 342 N.W.2d 699, 701
(1984).
5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982).
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procedure,6 or, if section 301 did not control, that federal law
preempted the state tort claim.7 The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals affirmed." The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, finding
that the state tort claim presented a separate and independent
cause of action not covered by section 3019 and, furthermore,
that federal law did not preempt the state law claim.10 The
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that a state law
claim that is "substantially dependent" for its resolution on the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement must be considered to
be a section 301 claim or must be dismissed due to its preemp-
tion by federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S.
Ct. 1904 (1985).
The supremacy clause of article VI of the United States
Constitution grants Congress the power to preempt state law.1
Federal preemption of conflicting or parallel state regulations
ensures the establishment of a single, uniform body of law.' 2 In
the field of labor relations, substantial litigation has arisen con-
6. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1915-16 (1985); Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
7. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1985).
8. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision is unpublished. See id.
9. Id. at 1909; Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 342 N.W.2d 699,
703 (1984).
10. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 575-76, 342 N.W.2d 699, 707
(1984).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 32, cl. 2. The supremacy clause reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
12. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-86
(1971). For more general information concerning the preemption doctrine, see Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975). Federal preemption occurs when Congress occupies the field
or when state law conflicts with a federal regulation. "A congressional design to occupy
the field supersedes the operation of state law on federally regulated subject matter
whether or not state regulation impairs the actual operation of the federal law." Id. at
625. Preemption based on the conflict of state and federal law requires the Court to
interpret the statute and determine the existence of a conflict. "The clearest conflict case
arises when a federal law mandates action forbidden by state law, or vice versa. As the
scope of state interference with a federal legislative scheme diminishes, however, the
presence of conflict becomes progressively more subtle." Id. at 626. In the area of federal
labor regulation, Congress did not seek to occupy the field entirely. Thus, courts must
determine whether state law conflicts with the federal legislative scheme.
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cerning the relationship between federal and state regulations
and the doctrine of preemption. s
Prior to the late 1930s, individual states regulated the field
of labor relations. 14 However, in National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,15 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld Congress's power to regulate labor relations
under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.16
Congress exercised this power by establishing the National La-
bor Relations Act1 7 and the Labor Management Relations Act. 8
By creating the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor
Management Relations Act, Congress sought to promote indus-
trial peace and stability by providing a comprehensive, uniform
body of law to govern labor relations. 19 Congress did not intend
to preempt all state regulations that may affect employers, em-
ployees, and unions.2 0 Neither did Congress, however, articulate
specific guidelines to limit the reach of federal labor regulations.
As a result, the Supreme Court has attempted to establish the
scope of federal labor law preemption without expressed con-
gressional directives.21
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Local 54,
104 S.Ct. 3179 (1984); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974);
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,
346 U.S. 485 (1953); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937). See generally, Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv.
1337 (1972); see also generally, A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 916-19 (9th ed. 1981). Cox outlines two primary lines of the preemption
doctrine. The first line concerns the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Act. The second line presents the question of how far federal law will reach in preempt-
ing conflicting or parallel state law.
14. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 916; see also Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
15. 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power To regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.").
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
19. See generally Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
275 (1971); Cox, supra note 13, at 1352; Comment, New York Telephone v. New York
State Department of Labor: Limiting the Doctrine of Implied Labor Law Pre-emption,
46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 297, 297 (1980).
20. Cox, supra note 13, at 1352; Comment, supra note 19, at 297-98. This approach
reflects concern for and deference to a state's interests in traditionally local matters.
21. Comment, supra note 19, at 298 n.8.
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The Supreme Court has established two basic lines of pre-
emption in the field of labor relations. The first line concerns
the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
over matters involving sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor
Relations Act. The second line involves the extent to which fed-
eral law may preempt state law, and, in particular, the extent to
which a state may regulate the collective bargaining process and
the terms of the contract.22
The Court considered the primary jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the Board) in San Di-
ego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.25 The Court concluded
that" [w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the
Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
competency of the ... Board. ' 24 There exist two exceptions to
the Garmon rule. First, federal labor law will not preempt state
law only remotely affecting the Act.25 Second, the Court will not
preempt state regulation of activity "touch[ing] interests ...
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. '2 These core
concerns have included libel,W violence28 and the intentional in-
fliction of mental distress. 29
The Supreme Court considered federal preemption as it af-
22. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 916-18.
23. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (denying state court jurisdiction over an employer's action
against the union for picketing even though the Board had earlier declined to exercise its
jurisdictional authority over the controversy).
24. Id. at 245.
25. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958) (al-
lowing a state court jurisdiction over a case involving an employee bringing action
against the union for wrongful expulsion).
26. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136 (1976) (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
27. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 214, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (finding
that a state libel cause of action brought by an official of the employer against the union
was not preempted and requiring compelling congressional direction to preempt because,
first, the cause of action was of traditional state concern, second, the cause of action was
of peripheral concern to the Act, and third, the action did not infringe on federal policy).
28. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (upholding state jurisdiction to
issue an injunction against picketing employees who threaten violence).
29. Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)
(concluding that National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction does not preempt an indi-
vidual employee's right to bring a tort action in state court against a union for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress).
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fects collective bargaining agreements s" in Local 24, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver.$" In Oliver, the
Court found that state law could not interfere with certain col-
lectively bargained solutions to wage problems and working con-
ditions.3 2 However, the Court focused on state regulations
designed to regulate industry and indicated that state health
and safety regulations may not necessarily be preempted. In
Malone v. White Motor Corp.3 4 the Court reaffirmed Oliver3 5
and found that federal preemption occurs when state law "con-
flicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or
the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances
that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the
States."3 8 The result of these decisions is that some state laws
affecting the mandatory terms of a collective bargaining agree-
30. See Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1983). The second branch of federal labor law preemption, preemp-
tion of state substantive law affecting the collective bargaining agreement, may be bro-
ken down into cases involving the bargaining process and cases involving the bargaining
agreement. Id. at 644-45. Allis-Chalmers does not address the bargaining process type of
preemption since Lueck's claim involved an established agreement. However, the bar-
gaining process type of preemption and the bargaining agreement preemption share
some common themes. In Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), the Su-
preme Court determined that preemption "ultimately depends upon whether the appli-
cation of state law. . . would operate to frustrate the purpose of the federal legislation."
Id. at 258. In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court stated that "[t]he failure of Congress to prohibit
certain conduct warrant[s a] negative inference that it was deemed proper, indeed desir-
able .... Thus, the state is not merely filling a gap when it outlaws what federal law
fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an economic contest a weapon that Congress
meant him to have available to him." Id. at 140 n.4 (citing Lesnick, Preemption Recon-
sidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469, 478 (1972)).
Machinists does provide an exception to this expansive preemptive power. The Court
will not preempt state regulations of activity "touch[ing] interests. . . deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility." Id. at 136 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)); see also Comment, supra note 19, at 302-07.
31. 358 U.S. 283 (1959). In Oliver, a provision of the collective bargaining agree-
ment governing the terms of the rental of motor vehicles was found by the Ohio courts to
violate state antitrust law.
32. Id. at 294-97. The Court reasoned that the Ohio antitrust law undermined Con-
gress's intent to promote industrial peace through arbitration pursuant to the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement in force between the parties.
33. Id. at 297; see Comment, supra note 30, at 646 n.57.
34. 435 U.S. 497 (1978). The Court upheld the validity of a Minnesota pension
fund that affected employers involved in collective bargaining agreements.
35. Id. at 512-14. The Court found that Malone fell within an exception to the
Oliver rule. The exception occurs when Congress explicitly indicates that it intends to
allow states to regulate an aspect of labor relations.
36. Id. at 504.
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ment are presumed to be preempted.
There exist two exceptions to this presumption of preemp-
tion. First, it is possible that the Court may not preempt a state
health and safety regulation.37 Second, the Court will not pre-
empt state law when Congress explicitly indicates that it intends
to allow states to regulate that area of law.38
Recently, in a case involving state law affecting the bargain-
ing process, the Court seemed to shift the presumption. 9 In
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of La-
bor,40 a plurality of the Court concluded that state laws of gen-
eral application 41 should receive greater deference and enjoy a
presumption of validity.42 Preemption will occur when a "com-
pelling congressional direction" requires that the Court find that
the state law is preempted.43 However, Justice Blackmun, in his
concurrence, denounced this shift in the preemption analysis."
In addition to the rules governing preemption of a cause of
action under state law, section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 45 affects the ability of an employer, an employee,
or a union to seek relief in state court on a state cause of action.
Individual employees seeking relief must first attempt to use the
grievance procedure established in the collective bargaining
37. See Oliver, 358 U.S. at 297; Malone, 435 U.S. at 513 n.13.
38. Malone, 435 U.S. at 512-13.
39. See A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 948. See generally Com-
ment, supra note 19; Comment, supra note 29.
40. 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (involving the payment of state unemployment compensa-
tion benefits to strikers).
41. A state law of general applicability is one that is not specifically designed to
regulate employers, employees or unions. Id. at 533.
42. Id. at 533; see also Comment, supra note 19, at 308.
43. New York Tel. Co., 440 U.S. at 547-51; see also Comment, supra note 19, at
313.
44. New York Tel. Co., 440 U.S. at 551. Justice Blackmun maintained that Con-
gress specifically intended to permit New York's unemployment compensation law to
coexist with the federal labor law. Thus, he concluded that federal law would not pre-
empt the state regulation.
45. Labor Management Relations Act § 301 states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
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agreement before seeking relief in state or federal court.46 Sec-
tion 301 then allows employers, employees, and unions to sue in
federal or state court for contract violations.47
Preemption under section 301 must be viewed in light of the
national policy underlying this provision. This policy is that uni-
form interpretation of the terms of contracts is necessary to en-
sure smooth negotiation and administration of collective bar-
gaining agreements. 48 Section 301 seeks to promote and protect
the collectively bargained arbitration procedures in order to
maintain peaceful labor relations.49 Section 301 allows federal
courts to fashion a body of federal common law that will control
collectively bargained agreements.50 Federal substantive law,
therefore, governs section 301 claims brought in federal or state
court.5 1 Moreover, the Court has deemed that the collective bar-
gaining agreement governs "the whole employment relation-
ship. ' 52 Thus, to a certain extent, federal law will preempt state
law affecting the terms of the employment relationship.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has articulated a policy
preference for arbitration under the collective bargaining agree-
ment.5 In particular, the Court has expressed its approach to
state law claims, section 301, and the role of arbitration in Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Maddox.54 In Maddox, an individual em-
ployee brought a suit for severence pay in state court without
first availing himself of the binding grievance procedure. 5 The
46. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
47. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (section 301 provides
concurrent jurisdiction); see also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (per-
mitting individual employees to bring suit against an employer for contract violations).
48. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
49. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653.
50. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). As an
example of courts fashioning federal common law, see Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361
U.S. 459 (1960). In this case, the Court held that "parties to a collective bargaining
agreement must express their meaning in unequivocal words before they can be said to
have agreed that the union's breaches of its promises should give rise to a defense
against the duty assumed by an employer to contribute to a welfare fund." Id. at 470-71.
51. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
52. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79
(1960).
53. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
54. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
55. Id. at 651.
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Court found that "Congress has expressly approved contract
grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling dis-
putes."56 The binding arbitration agreement prevented the em-
ployee from bypassing the grievance procedure and seeking re-
lief in state court.57
In the noted case, the claimant Lueck asserted a tort
claim.58 The tort claim is significant because the cause of action
is a claim of general application rather than a law directly affect-
ing the labor relations of the parties. Further, the cause of action
indirectly arises from the collective bargaining agreement. This
is true because the tort is not a tortious breach of contract but
rather a "separate intentional wrong" resulting from a duty cre-
ated by the contractual relationship between the insurer and the
insured.5 9 The insurer's breach of this duty does not depend
upon a corresponding breach of the contract.
The United States Supreme Court, in Allis-Chalmers v.
Lueck, addressed the issue of whether federal labor policy allows
an individual employee who does not attempt to seek relief
through a grievance procedure to bring a. state claim in state
court for the bad faith handling of an insurance claim. 0 The is-
sue involves preemption affecting the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement; it does not involve board preemption. Justice
Blackmun, writing for a unanimous court,"1 examined the case
under the Oliver-Malone analysis. As a result, the crucial ques-
tion was whether the state claim would "frustrate the federal
labor-contract scheme. 62 In this particular case, the federal la-
56. Id. at 653.
57. Id. at 652-53.
58. There is a cause of action for the bad faith handling of an insurance claim
under Wisconsin law. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d
368 (1978). See generally Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413
(1931) (duty to handle a contract in good faith derives from the contract).
59. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 687, 271 N.W.2d 368, 374
(1978); see also Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984)
(asserting that Lueck's claim is not premised on a breach of contract but rather on the
manner in which the claim was handled that gave rise to the tort cause of action). But
see Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1914 (1985) ("[T]here is no indication
in Wisconsin law that the tort is anything more than a way to plead a certain kind of
contract violation in tort in order to recover exemplary damages not otherwise available
under Wisconsin law.").
60. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1910.
61. Id. at 1907.
62. Id. at 1910.
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bor-contract scheme concerns the resolution of contractual dis-
putes as established by section 301 and federal common law. 3
The Court held that under Wisconsin law the good faith ob-
ligation "sounded in both tort and contract"" and that the par-
ties may establish the "reasonable" or "good faith" performance
of their contract.6 5 The Court reasoned that the good faith obli-
gation fails to create a nonnegotiable, independent state right.6 6
Applying a broad reading to the scope of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the Court concluded that Lueck's claim consti-
tutes a contractual dispute covered by the contract and thus
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.6 7 To allow Lueck
to pursue such a claim would run counter to the federal policy
requiring individual employees to attempt to use the grievance
procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement
before seeking relief in state or federal court.6 ' Therefore, the
Court ruled "that when resolution of a state-law claim is sub-
stantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement
made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must
either be treated as a § 301 claim. . . or dismissed as preempted
by federal labor-contract law.'" 9
Justice Blackmun's analysis of Lueck's claim provides an
analytical framework from which one can consider other state
tort claims that affect or touch upon the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. This requires examining the Court's ap-
63. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). Under section
301, "[s]tate law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth func-
tioning of that process thus strikes at the very core of federal policy." Id. at 104.
64. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1914; see Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85
Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
65. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978);
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
66. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1912-16.
67. Id. at 1911; see Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983). In
Bowen, the Court stated that:
[A] collective-bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized
code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly antici-
pate." Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 547, 578
(1960). In defining the relationships created by such an agreement, the Court
has applied an evolving federal common law grounded in national labor policy.
Id. at 224-25. It is from this notion of the scope of collective bargaining agreements that
the Court derives its approach in Allis-Chalmers.
68. This federal policy was also discussed in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 652 (1963).
69. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1916.
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proach to preemption in this case and how this approach influ-
ences the scope of the phrase "substantially dependent."
The Allis-Chalmers Court rejects any analogy between
Lueck's claim and state tort claims that fall under the primary
judisdiction preemption doctrine.70 Two arguments support the
Court's position. First, the Court has previously maintained that
the primary jurisdiction preemption doctrine is "not relevant" to
section 301 cases. 71 Second, since Allis-Chalmers involves a con-
flict between state law and federal common law, the case does
not fall within the primary jurisdiction line of preemption. The
policy reason for the distinction between these two lines of pre-
emption demonstrates the delicate balance which the Court
seeks to maintain in the area of federalism. In primary jurisdic-
tion cases, the "core concerns" or "local interest" exception ap-
plies because "appropriate consideration for the vitality of our
federal system and for a rational allocation of functions belies
any easy inference that Congress intended to deprive the States
of their ability to retain jurisdiction over such matters. '72 On the
other hand, the Court seems to afford less deference to the
states when preemption will be based on a conflict between state
and federal substantive law. "Where . . . the issue is one of an
asserted substantive conflict with a federal enactment, then
'[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not ma-
terial. . . for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the
federal law must prevail.' ,,7"
The Court's approach under the substantive law preemption
70. Id. at 1911 n.6. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the state tort claim
touched state interests, concerned the Labor Management Relations Act only peripher-
ally, and did not interfere with the federal scheme. The Lueck court reached this analy-
sis after concluding that § 301 was not applicable to the case. Id. at 566, 342 N.W.2d
at 703. Lueck v. Aetna Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 566-77, 342 N.W.2d 699, 703-08 (1984).
The Wisconsin analysis closely followed Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25,
430 U.S. 290 (1977), where the Supreme Court found an exception to the preemption
doctrine based on a state tort action, brought against the union, for emotional distress.
Carpenter falls under the primary jurisdiction line of preemption.
71. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962). The Court
stated that "[s]ince this was a suit for violation of a collective bargaining contract within
the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Managment Relations Act of 1947, the pre-emptive
doctrine of cases such as . . . Garmon . . . based upon the exclusive jurisdicton of the
National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant." Id.
72. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Local 54, 104 S.
Ct. 3179, 3187 (1984).
73. Id. (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962)).
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doctrine in this case appears to reject the New York Telephone
presumption with respect to laws of general applicability.74 In-
stead, the Court analogizes to Malone and also looks to the pol-
icy and rules established in Maddox and other section 301
cases.75 Since Malone endorses the presumption of preemption,
it seems likely that the Court in Allis-Chalmers operates under
the same presumption. In fact, the Court asserts that section 301
demands that federal law override conflicting state law.76 In
light of the less deferential approach to states under this analy-
sis of preemption, it seems clear that the Court is announcing a
broad approach to preemption in section 301 cases.
The preemptive approach of Allis-Chalmers is founded on
certain policy considerations. The primary concern of the Court
is that to allow an individual employee to pursue a state claim
without first attempting to use the grievance procedure would
result in an overwhelming number of employees bringing con-
tractual grievances disguised as state tort claims.7 7 The griev-
ance procedure preserves industrial peace by providing an or-
derly mechanism to hear and resolve contractual disputes.
Permitting Lueck to pursue his state cause of action would un-
dermine this fundamental policy of labor law.
The manner in which courts may extend Allis-Chalmers de-
pends on the interpetation of the phrase "substantially depen-
dent." This language fails to give a clear definition as to which
state claims will fall within the ambit of Allis-Chalmers. The
phrase must be viewed in the context of the Court's strong posi-
tion on the fundamental role of the grievance procedure and its
application of preemption to the state claim.
Lueck's state tort claim was a separate and independent
cause of action that arose from a contractual relationship.78 Sim-
ilarly, other state tort actions that arise from a contractual rela-
74. The Court distinguishes New York Telephone as falling under § 7 or § 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1911-12 n.6. Allis-Chalmers
rejects the state law presumption of general applicability in the area of § 301 and the
grievance procedure. It is possible that the New York Telephone presumption may con-
tinue to be applied in other areas of labor law.
75. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1912 n.7.
76. Id. at 1910 (citing Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-06
(1962)).
77. Id. at 1915-16.
78. Id. at 1916.
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tionship would fall within the ambit of Allis-Chalmers.9 Also,
the policy basis underlying preemption in this case was that the
impact of the state tort claim adversely affected federal common
law governing the grievance procedure.8 0 Hence, state tort ac-
tions impinging on the grievance procedure will fall within Allis-
Chalmers. Finally, according to the Court, Lueck's cause of ac-
tion did not constitute a nonnegotiable right.8 1 Unless a claim-
ant can maintain that the state tort confers nonnegotiable rights
independent of the contract, the cause of action will be pre-
empted by federal law under the Allis-Chalmers decision.
Therefore, a state tort that relies on a contract for its existence
potentially undermines the federal policy goals of settling labor
disputes through the grievance procedure and fails to confer
nonnegotiable rights on the claimant. Such tort claims will be
preempted according to Allis-Chalmers.
LYN SUZANNE ENTZEROTH
U.C.C.-LETTERS OF CREDIT AND "FRAUD IN THE
TRANSACTION"
Limited partners brought an action to enjoin payment of
drafts under standby letters of credit which they had provided
as part of their investment in a real estate limited partnership,
79. An example of this type of tort would be wrongful discharge claims. See infra
note 81.
80. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1911-12.
81. Id. at 1914-15. This argument has arisen in wrongful discharge cases that have
followed Allis-Chalmers. In Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663 (9th Cir.
1985), the Ninth Circuit, in dicta, argued that the California tort for wrongful termina-
tion conferred "non-negotiable state-law rights" on the employee. Id. at 668. Thus,
wrongful discharge claims may survive preemption as interpreted in Allis-Chalmers. The
Eighth Circuit reached the opposite result. In Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 610 F. Supp.
757 (E.D. Mo. 1985), the court found that the ruling in Allis-Chalmers compelled the
preemption of the cause of action for retaliatory discharge under the state's workers'
compensation law. The court argued that "the Missouri law in this case is related di-
rectly to and affects the contractual relationship between the parties, [and, therefore,] it
is preempted by federal law." Id. at 759.
It is unclear how Allis-Chalmers will apply to wrongful discharge claims. However,
the broad reading of preemption that the Court applied tends to support the conclusion
that the state law will be preempted.
